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 Dutch coastal land markets are characterized by high amenity values but are threatened by po-
tential coastal hazards, leading to high potential damage costs from flooding. Yet, Dutch resi-
dents generally perceive low or no flood risk. Using an agent-based land market model and 
Dutch survey data on risk perceptions and location preferences, this paper explores the pat-
terns of land development and land rents produced by buyers with low, highly skewed risk 
perceptions. We find that, compared to representative agent and uniform risk perception mod-
els, the skewed risk perception distribution produces substantially more, high-valued devel-
opment in risky coastal zones, potentially creating economically significant risks triggered by 
the current Dutch flood protection policy. 
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Empirical research has established a good under-
standing of the drivers of land value: spatial fac-
tors such as the productive potential of the land, 
proximity to destinations of interest, and neigh-
borhood amenities and disamenities, as well as 
characteristics of land market participants, includ-
ing available budgets, relative preferences for 
spatial factors, and perception of risk. Analytical 
models effectively demonstrate how these factors 
contribute to potential land rents, given fairly 
simple representations of space and a limited di-
versity of participants in the land market. How-
ever, for many real-world problems, the effects of 
diversity in both land market participants and 
their spatial environment, and the ways in which 
individual and spatial diversity interact and feed 
back to shape the evolution of land rents over 
time, are central to research questions of interest. 
Modeling such problems requires innovative new 
modeling approaches (Irwin 2010). 
 In this paper, we model a real-world problem 
with such characteristics, the case of Dutch coastal 
land markets. Land in the coastal zone is charac-
terized by high amenity values, contributing to its 
attractiveness for development, and to high levels 
of flood risk. The extent and value of develop-
ment in the coastal zone depend on the risk per-
ceptions of those participating in the land market. 
At the same time, investments in flood-protection 
infrastructure by the government will be moti-
vated by the economic value of development along 
the coast. These two factors lead to a potential 
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upward cycle of coastal development and eco-
nomic vulnerability. If participants in the land 
market have a sufficiently low perception of risk, 
intensive development will occur along the coasts, 
and land values will be relatively high. These 
high land values may motivate higher levels of 
flood protection, leading in turn to reduced risk 
perceptions and further coastal development. 
 While most of the Dutch coast is protected by a 
state-financed system of dikes, certain coastal 
areas are excluded from public flood protection 
since their protection is not cost-efficient for so-
ciety (Rijkswaterstaat 2002). Nevertheless, in-
dividuals may invest in these areas at their own 
risk (Poelmann Commissie 2005, Deltacommissie 
2008). Yet, the risk perceptions of Dutch resi-
dents remain low, raising the question of how 
economically vulnerable developments in these 
unprotected regions might be. This paper presents 
a model to explore one aspect of this problem: 
how the risk perceptions of Dutch citizens might 
shape land development and land values in these 
unprotected coastal zones. Moving beyond the 
abstract modeling work presented in Filatova, van 
der Veen, and Parker (2009), this paper uses sur-
vey data to motivate, parameterize, and qualita-
tively validate our model. Specifically, we focus 
on how the real-world, highly skewed risk per-
ceptions of market participants affect land market 
outcomes. We employ an agent-based computa-
tional economics modeling approach to tackle this 
problem, as these models are uniquely suited to 
explore land market outcomes that are driven by 
interactions between individual and spatial het-
erogeneity (Irwin 2010). 
 The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss 
agent-based computational economics as a tool to 
model complex land market dynamics. Second, as 
an example of a problem at the frontier of the 
economics of land use, we discuss the case of 
land markets in Dutch coastal towns and summa-
rize results of a survey conducted in the Nether-
lands in 2008. Then, we briefly review conven-
tional economic models that capture effects of 
spatial amenities and disamenities on land rents 
and patterns, and we outline the basic mecha-
nisms of our agent-based land market model. Fi-
nally, we present and discuss the results of a 
coastal land market model parameterized using 
our survey data and provide discussion and con-
clusions. 
Agent-Based Computational Economics for 
the Economics of Land Use 
 
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) uses 
simulation methods to study economies as evolv-
ing systems of autonomous interacting heteroge-
neous agents (Axtell 2005, Tesfatsion and Judd 
2006). In ACE models, agents individually make 
decisions based on the state of the environment 
and their personal preferences and behavioral 
rules, which in market models are based on mi-
croeconomic principles. When a population of 
such agents interact in the simulation environ-
ment, one may observe emergent phenomena or 
patterns (e.g., price and trade volume, land use 
patterns, etc.). ACE has been widely applied to a 
variety of market settings, including financial, 
electricity, commodity, and labor markets (Ep-
stein and Axtell 1996, Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane 
1997, Kirman and Vriend 2001, LeBaron 2006, 
Marks 2006, Tesfatsion 2006). Often ACE models 
replace a centralized price determination mecha-
nism (i.e., equilibrium conditions motivated by a 
story of a Walrasian auctioneer) with decentral-
ized bilateral trading among agents (Tesfatsion 
and Judd 2006). Due to this flexible model struc-
ture, ACE provides a platform for wider explora-
tion of out-of-equilibrium dynamics (Arthur 2006), 
agent heterogeneity (Kirman 1992), bounded ra-
tionality (Simon 1997), and interaction between 
agents (Axtell 2005). 
 Economic agents in ACE models are usually 
heterogeneous, involved in interactions with each 
other and their environment, boundedly rational, 
and able to learn and adapt to the behavior of 
other traders and aggregated market conditions. 
These aspects of ACE models make them well-
suited to the modeling of land markets. As dis-
cussed in greater detail in Parker and Filatova 
(2008), Filatova, Parker, and van der Veen (2009), 
and Irwin (2010), economic agents operating in 
land markets (including residential buyers and 
sellers, developers, and rural landowners) gener-
ally have heterogeneous preferences, resources, 
and knowledge, and the landscape over which 
land markets operate is characterized by spatially 
heterogeneous patterns and complex networks. 
Land market participants have imperfect informa-
tion when forming expectations about land values 
because each spatial good has unique characteris-
tics in space and time, and because housing mar-
ket goods are infrequently purchased. These mar-
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ket characteristics limit the applicability of tradi-
tional economic tools for modeling land markets. 
Specifically, analytical urban economic models 
accommodate agents’ heterogeneity only in com-
bination with a 1D landscape (Anas 1990, Epple 
and Platt 1998, Irwin 2010) and not more than 
two attributes of the spatial landscape [e.g., dis-
tance to Central Business District (CBD) with 
either amenities or hazard risks]. The main reason 
for this limitation is that spatial patterns of equi-
librium land rents in such models are generally 
identified through simplifying assumptions re-
garding individual and/or spatial heterogeneity 
(for example, that buyer utilities are equated over 
space) (Parker and Filatova 2008). Spatial econo-
metric models successfully accommodate hetero-
geneity of the 2D landscape but reflect only a 
snapshot of a market, as they are estimated using 
transaction prices, which represent the net results 
of bargaining between buyers (based on their will-
ingness to pay) and sellers (based on their will-
ingness to accept). This implies that predictions 
from a regression model based on past transac-
tions may not be robust when underlying be-
havior or economic conditions change, altering 
willingness to pay and accept (Bockstael 1996). 
The statistically estimated demand curve or the 
probability of choosing a location by a represen-
tative agent based on historic data is static, once 
estimated, while individual location choices may 
change with time (e.g., because of changing pref-
erences or macroeconomic conditions). ACE ap-
proaches to modeling land markets represent a 
practical and flexible alternative. Irwin (2010) 
covers these issues in great detail, reviewing lit-
erature from multiple disciplines and providing a 
detailed analysis of the strengths and limitations 
of traditional economic modeling methods and 
the potential contributions of agent-based meth-
ods. While focused more broadly, Nolan et al. 
(2009) provides a general introduction to agent-
based models for agricultural economists. Schrein-
emachers et al. (2010) provides another recent re-
view of agent-based models that address spatial 
and individual-level heterogeneity in an agricul-
tural context. 
 
Motivation and Case Study Data: Dutch 
Coastal Towns Under Risk 
 
Coastal towns throughout the world are charac-
terized by rich amenities (beaches, coastal view, 
etc.) and are often vulnerable to flooding or ero-
sion. Both spatial attributes affect property prices, 
driving them in opposite directions. Naturally, 
these positive and negative amenities in coastal 
towns are spatially correlated (Bin, Kruse, and 
Landry 2008). 
 In the Netherlands the coast is protected by a 
state-financed system of dikes and dunes with 
estimated flood probability levels of 1 in 10,000 
years. Although flood probabilities are believed 
to be small, due to the high value of developed 
lands in the dike-protected areas the consequences 
of a disaster are enormous. The Dutch govern-
ment uses a concept of “risk”1 [R in equation (1), 
known as expected loss in economics] as the main 
criterion for coastal management (Rijkswaterstaat 
2005). In short, if damage costs are high, even a 
low probability of flooding entails a high level of 
risk: 
(1) R = probability × risk 
 In addition, there are 13 coastal towns in the 
Netherlands that contain designated “outside-the-
dike” areas (see Figure 1a). Each town is divided 
into two zones: a legally protected one (to the 
right of the black line in Figure 1b, where prob-
ability of erosion/flood is 1:10000 or 1:4000), and 
a zone where the government does not guarantee 
any safety level—i.e., an unprotected zone (Rijks-
waterstaat 2005). All of the 13 Dutch coastal towns 
have urban developments in “outside-the-dike” 
areas, with total potential damage for the unpro-
tected areas of €6.6 billion (Rijkswaterstaat 2005). 
In October 2005 the Poelmann Commission (2005) 
published an official recommendation to the gov-
ernment concerning the future of these coastal 
cities under risk. It advised to allow development 
in the areas beyond the flood defense line. How-
ever, individuals, not the government, should take 
responsibility for these risks. Given an absence of 
government regulation (and a lack of availability 
of private or public flood insurance), market 
forces will determine the spatial pattern of devel-
opment and accompanying land rents. Conse-
quently, the total risk in these coastal towns will 
depend on individual decisions in the land mar-
ket. However, there is a concern that individuals 
                                                                                    
1 EU water management has used this notion of risk ≠ probability for 
at least 10 years. Throughout this paper, by risk we mean probability × 
effect. 
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Figure 1a. Risk Towns, i.e., Coastal Cities with 
Outside the Dike Areas 
 
 
Figure 1b. Flood Defence Line (Kernzone) 
That Divides a City into the Legally Protected 
and Unprotected Zone 
Source: Rijkswaterstaat (2005). 
are largely unaware of the risks involved (Bočk-
arjova, van der Veen, and Geurts 2008, Kryw-
kow, Filatova, and van der Veen 2008, Terpstra 
and Gutteling 2008). These circumstances raise 
an important policy question: how will the risk 
perceptions of participants in Dutch coastal land 
markets affect the degree of land development, 
the value of developed lands, and the consequent 
degree of flood risk? 
 In order to provide data to inform investigation 
of this question, a household mail survey was 
conducted in February 2008 in the Dutch prov-
ince of Zeeland (Krywkow, Filatova, and van der 
Veen 2008). This province experienced the most 
severe damage during the last coastal flood, in 
1953, and it includes a coastal town that contains 
outside-the-dike areas. Among other goals, the 
survey sought to elucidate individual perceptions 
of flood risk and factors affecting individual lo-
cation choice. The respondents were asked, on a 1 
to 5 scale, “How worried are you that flooding 
can affect you?” Following Slovic et al. (2004) 
and Raaijmakers, Krywkow, and van der Veen 
(2008), this “worry” variable is taken as the indi-
cator of individual risk perception. Figure 2 
shows the frequency of distribution of opinions 
among the 436 respondents. 
 Figure 2 demonstrates that the level of worry 
among individuals is dispersed (mean of 2.31, 
sd = 1.05), and the peak of the distribution is 
skewed to the left, meaning that the majority of 
people have a very low level of concern regarding 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Individual Level of 
Worry That Flooding Could Affect 
Respondent Personally (1 = do not worry at 
all, 5 = worry very much) 
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flooding, in spite of the fact that 25.5 percent of 
the respondents had personal experience with the 
1953 flood, with some suffering financial damage 
or causalities in their families. Only 2.8 percent of 
respondents believe that a severe flood is likely to 
occur in the future, and 91.8 percent are not pre-
pared in the case of a disaster. Other survey ques-
tions elucidated that 68.7 percent of respondents 
consider government responsible for providing 
safety and that 77.3 percent of the sample consi-
der technical measures (dikes) as the best flood 
defense measure (Krywkow, Filatova, and van 
der Veen 2008). In short, current Dutch residents 
have a high degree of confidence in the ability of 
the dike system to protect them against flood-
ing—even potentially for some areas where that 
protection is not ensured by the government. 
 The survey also studied the importance of vari-
ous factors for location choice (proximity to the 
employment center, environmental amenities, and 
flood safety). Figure 3 reports that time and dis-
tance to work are the two most important factors. 
Many people also considered environmental ameni-
ties, including coastal amenities, to be an impor-
tant factor. Safety from flooding is the least im-
portant factor for Dutch people in their location 
choice. This means that an average respondent 
might settle in the flood-prone area along the coast 
if it provides coastal amenities, since the impor-
tance of the latter is higher than safety. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Importance of Different Factors for 
People Buying a House 
Notes: X axis: 1 = absolutely not important, 5 = extremely 
important. A number in brackets along the Y axis is the 
number of observations. A circle symbolizes the mean value, 
the solid line shows standard deviation, and a dotted line 
connects min and max values. 
 In addition, the survey used a contingent valua-
tion (CV) approach to elucidate respondents’ per-
ceived monetary value of coastal amenities and 
safety from flooding attached to location.2 The 
CV method was used to value both environmental 
amenities (Alberini et al. 2005) and flood risk 
(Shabman and Stephenson 1996). Although often 
hedonic price techniques are used to estimate the 
contribution of spatial attributes to property val-
ues, a CV approach was more practical in this case. 
First, since coastal flooding in the Netherlands is 
rare, it is very unlikely that housing prices in the 
past have integrated flood risk. However, risk 
perception and willingness to pay for flood pro-
tection might have risen following Hurricane 
Katrina. Second, since the implementation of the 
Poelmann Commission recommendation was still 
under discussion, there were no actual transaction 
data for the outside-the-dike areas under new 
policy. 
 Survey respondents were asked to state how 
much more they would be willing to pay for a 
house that (i) has a seaside view and (ii) is located 
in a safe3 zone, compared to a similar €200,000 
house (the average in the province) that (i) has no 
view and (ii) is located in a risky zone. The ma-
jority of respondents, 78 percent of whom were 
homeowners, stated that they were willing to pay 
a positive amount for each locational attribute, 
while about 17 percent of the sample were indif-
ferent (Table 1). 
 For further analysis we consider only positive 
willingness to pay (WTP) statements, excluding 
the “protest” responses. The mean value of the two 
WTP measures are reported in Table 2 for four 
groups: (i) all in sample, (ii) respondents who had 
coastal flood experience (FE) in the Netherlands, 
(iii) those who had flood experience elsewhere, 
and finally (iv) those who did not have any flood 
experience. 
 As seen in Table 2, the average WTP value for 
each locational attribute (coastal amenities and 
safety from flooding) is almost the same as its 
standard deviation. This diversity in responses 
                                                                                    
2 While these CV estimates were not used to parameterize our land 
market model for reasons discussed in detail in Filatova (2009), they 
motivated the structure of our model of buyer’s bidding behavior and 
provide a benchmark for qualitative validation of model results. 
3 The survey did not use specific probabilities but rather used qualita-
tive definitions of safe (i.e., protected by the government) and risky (out-
side-the-dike) area. 
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Table 1. Percentages of Respondents Answering the WTP Questions (n = 436) 
Variable (n = 436) Negative Payment Zero Payment Positive Payment No Answer 
WTP for coastal amenity 5.05% 17.2% 63.99% 13.76% 
WTP for safety 3.9% 16.97% 66.51% 12.61% 
 
 
Table 2. The Mean WTP 
Variable All 
With Flood Experience 
in the NL 
With Flood Experience 
Elsewhere No Flood Experience 
WTP for coastal 
amenity 
44,229 
(30782 / 279) 
46,713 
(31994 / 143) 
47,046 
(28739 / 44) 
39,709 
(28713 / 103) 
WTP for safety 47,069 
(30018 / 290) 
47,273 
(30378 / 143) 
54,444 
(29885 / 54) 
44,151 
(29110 / 106) 
Note: Notation is mean (sd / n). 
 
 
might have been caused by differences in indi-
vidual preferences for coastal amenities and indi-
vidual beliefs about the actual risks associated 
with flooding. However, regressions modeling 
WTP for safety found both the level of worry and 
an income proxy to be significantly positively 
correlated with WTP, as theory would predict 
(Filatova 2009). 
 These micro-level survey data provide some 
insights about individual location decisions that 
may be used to explore land market dynamics in 
coastal towns. Below, we briefly review other 
approaches to parameterizing ACE decision mod-
els and provide additional details on our model 
parameterization. 
 
Land Market Agent-Based Model and Survey 
Data 
 
Given that ACE is a fairly new field, protocols for 
parameterizing agent decision models with real-
world data have not been fully codified. Strate-
gies for empirical parameterization depend on the 
modeling methods, the goal of the modeling ef-
fort, and the quality of available data. In contrast 
to the process of parameterizing environmental 
processes, which usually follow well-established 
physical laws, it is less straightforward for a mod-
eler to describe the process of human decision 
making and to empirically parameterize agents 
(Berger and Schreinemachers 2006, Robinson et 
al. 2007). Due to their bottom-up nature, empiri-
cal agent-based models (ABMs) require disaggre-
gated micro-level data about agents’ characteris-
tics and/or agents’ behavior. Micro-level data can 
be obtained either by observing decision making 
of a land-user in a controlled environment (Duffy 
2006), from interviews and participatory work-
shops with stakeholders (Barreteau, Bousquet, 
and Attonaty 2001), or by gathering survey data 
(Fernandez et al. 2005, Brown and Robinson 
2006). Often, decisions must be made regarding 
how to incorporate qualitative survey information 
into the formal rules of the model. ACE models in 
marketing (Bonabeau 2002) and financial markets 
(Hommes 2006) frequently use the extended mi-
cro-information about individual market decisions 
(easily available for such markets) in ABMs. Due 
to the costs of micro-level information acquisition 
and other challenges (Berger and Schreinemach-
ers 2006, Haase et al. 2008), still few land-use 
ABMs currently use individual-level survey data. 
 For our model, the relative importance of spa-
tial characteristics from the survey is used to mo-
tivate the structure of the utility function in our 
model parameterization. We translated the quali-
tative level of worry that an individual has about 
potential negative effects of flooding into a quan-
titative distribution of perceived damages from 
flooding, making the assumption that worry re-
garding flooding could be associated with per-
ceived flood damages. This parameterization al-
lows us to create a model to answer the question: 
What patterns of location and land value might 
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emerge from buyers with this real-world distribu-
tion of flood risk? We assess the results of our 
modeling effort by examining whether our mod-
eled WTP and land transactions, given imple-
mented decision structure based on stated levels 
of risk perception from the survey data, are con-
sistent with the WTP estimates obtained from the 
survey data. This assessment provides qualitative 
validation of the success of our model, on the as-
sumption that a model parameterized with em-
pirical behavioral rules should replicate empirical 
behavior. 
 
The ALMA-C Model 
 
Economic agents in a coastal land market face 
trade-offs between a high amenity waterfront with 
flood risk and a lower coastal amenity level in ex-
change for higher safety. To explore urban land 
rents and land pattern dynamics for the popula-
tion of agents with skewed distribution of per-
ceived risk, we have developed a two-dimensional 
urban agent-based land market model (ALMA). 
Since ALMA has been already extensively de-
scribed (Parker and Filatova 2008, Filatova, 
Parker, and van der Veen 2009, Filatova, van der 
Veen, and Parker 2009), we provide only a brief 
description here, highlighting the assumptions and 
features most relevant for this application. 
 
Building Blocks: Conventional Spatial Economic 
Models 
 
Many of the individual elements affecting loca-
tion decisions in coastal towns have been mod-
eled individually using analytical approaches. Wu 
(2001) modifies a 2-D monocentric urban model 
to include coastal amenities, using a budget-con-
strained utility maximization model based on 
amenity and proximity values. MacDonald, Mur-
doch, and White (1987) and Frame (1998) model 
location choice in a flood-prone area as a con-
strained expected-utility maximization problem 
using an aspatial model with discrete flood risk. 
Tatano, Yamaguchi, and Okada (2004) similarly 
model location choice in a city where disaster risk 
is present, and include potential bias in house-
holds’ perception of disaster risk. Thus, the stan-
dard urban economics model of Alonso (1964) 
has been extended to account for either environ-
mental amenities or natural hazard risk, but not 
both simultaneously in a spatially explicit model. 
To our knowledge, it is not possible to incorpo-
rate both the three sources of spatial heterogene-
ity (distance to CBD, flood risk, and coastal 
amenities) and the agent heterogeneity (e.g., risk 
perceptions) in an analytical equilibrium model, 
as discussed earlier. 
 
Agent-Based Land Market Model 
 
The ALMA model for the coast (ALMA-C) simu-
lates the emergence of urban land patterns and 
land rents as a result of bilateral interactions be-
tween buyers and sellers of land with application 
to a coastal city. ALMA-C borrows much from 
analytical monocentric urban models (including 
trade-offs between travel costs to the CBD and 
land rent, the fact that land is allocated to the 
highest bidder, and utility dependent on amenities 
and distance to the CBD) and an expected utility 
approach. Differences show up in the direct mod-
eling of price formation, the heterogeneity of both 
agents and the spatial landscape, and the simula-
tion approach used to derive a market equilib-
rium. Similarly to other abstract models of its type, 
ALMA-C does not strive to represent all driving 
factors of land-use change that might be included 
in a fully empirical model designed for landscape 
projection and scenario analysis. Rather, it is a 
stylized model designed to illuminate empirically 
motivated, but abstract, outcomes. Thus, although 
factors identified as most important for housing 
choice in our study area are included, some fac-
tors, such as housing characteristics and public 
amenities, are excluded to best focus the model 
on the research question of interest. Further, the 
model operates over an abstract landscape and, 
consistent with other models of its type, the model 
is initialized with the assumption that all proper-
ties are available for sale, in order to avoid arti-
facts due to initial landscape patterns. 
 
 Spatial landscape. All three experiments dis-
cussed in this paper were performed on the land-
scape of 35 by 63 cells, initialized with 1,890 
buyers and 1,890 sellers. Since in equilibrium the 
model is essentially an open city model, some 
buyers may choose to not purchase a property, 
meaning that the number of converted cells and 
thus the size of the city will vary between ex-
periments. Each cell is assumed to represent a 
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single property differentiated by distance (Dcbd) 
from the CBD (which is normalized by landscape 
size to an inverse measure Prox, in order to con-
trol for the size of the landscape), the level of 
coastal amenities (A ) (estimated as a normalized 
distance to the coast), and an objective probabil-
ity of flooding or erosion (PFobj) that is a function 
of distance to the coast Dcoast. The probability of 
flooding is fairly constant close to the coast, then 
falls off abruptly at a given distance, in order to 
qualitatively represent the “outside-the-dike” ar-
eas (see Figure 4, top graph) in Dutch coastal 
towns discussed above. The exact equations de-
scribing estimation of spatial attributes can be 
found in Filatova, Parker, and van der Veen (2009) 
and Filatova, van der Veen, and Parker (2009). 
 The land market. Following an ACE approach, 
the centralized price determination mechanism of 
the standard analytical model is replaced by a set 
of bilateral trades in ALMA. At initialization, all 
land is assumed to be under agricultural use (i.e., 
each cell is occupied by a seller with the reserva-
tion price equal to the price of agricultural land), 
and the CBD is exogenously set as in the Alonso 
model. Market interactions start when sellers an-
nounce their ask prices and buyers enter the mar-
ket to search for the best deal and start submitting 
their offer-bids, purchasing only one property. A 
seller collects all possible bids and selects the 
highest, if any. A trade occurs if the highest bid is 
above the seller’s ask price. The final transaction 
price (i.e., land rent) is an arithmetic average of 
the ask price and the highest bid price. Successful 
buyers and sellers then leave the market, with 
unsuccessful buyers assumed to locate elsewhere 
per the open city assumption. The model contin-
ues in the next round with an updated landscape 
and an updated (lower) number of buyers, sellers, 
and properties on the market until all the gains 
from trade are exhausted. At this point, the land 
market has essentially reached an equilibrium 
where no buyer or seller has an incentive to en-
gage in additional trading. 
 Buyers’ behavior. Buyers search for the loca-
tion that maximizes their expected utility [equa-
tion (2)] and is affordable under their disposable 
budget for housing net of transport costs (Y ). The 
Dutch survey showed that proximity to work and 
environmental amenities are the most important 
factors that affect individual location choices. Al- 
 
 
Figure 4. Function of the Probability of a 
Coastal Hazard as a Distance to the Coast (top 
graph) and Land Rent Patterns, Experiment 1 
(homogeneous agents parameterized  with the 
mean  value from the survey) (bottom graph) 
 
 
though other factors are likely to affect bids, in-
cluding them here would complicate model analy-
sis and results without adding new insights rele-
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vant to our case study. Thus, α and β in the utility 
function denote individual preferences for coastal 
amenities and proximity correspondingly: 
 
 (2)    ln( ) ln( )
( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,idam
U A Prox
E U PF U C PF U
= α× +β×
= × × − + − ×
 
 
where [0,1]idamC ∈  is a damage coefficient denot-
ing the loss from flood or erosion as perceived by 
an agent i, and PF is the probability of flooding. 
The distribution of survey responses regarding 
worry about flood risk is used to parameterize the 
coefficient idamC  in equation (2). Note that the 
level of worry in Figure 2 varies from 1 to 5 and 
the damage coefficient varies from 0 to 1. Thus, 
the distribution is normalized through translation 
to a scale from 0 to 1, implying that the average 
damage coefficient is now 0.33. 
 A buyer identifies the property that gives her 
maximum utility and forms her WTP for the prop-
erty. In an analytical model, an economic agent 
maximizes her utility by finding the optimal com-
bination of housing and non-housing goods under 
her budget constraint. In the absence of an equi-
librium price determination mechanism in the 
agent-based model, it is not possible to solve a 
budget-constrained utility maximization problem, 
because market-clearing assumptions are needed 
to solve for the price of housing in the budget 
constraint. [See Parker and Filatova (2008) and 
Filatova, van der Veen, and Parker (2009) for dis-
cussion, and Ettema (2011) and Magliocca et al. 
(2011) for examples of a price expectation mecha-
nism that could be used to determine an expected 
purchase price for a property.] To allow for out-
of-equilibrium price determination, we construct 
a WTP function that reflects the assumption of 
weak separability of the housing and non-housing 
goods. Specifically, a buyer’s WTP is a function 
of her expected utility E (U ), her individual bud-
get net of travel costs (Y ), and the prices of all 
other goods (the influence of which is expressed 
by a constant b that determines the convexity of 
the WTP for housing): 
 (3) 
2
2 2
( )
( )WTP
Y E UP
b E U
×= + . 
Thus, there is substitutability between housing 
and non-housing goods (a buyer agent will spend 
part of her budget on housing and transport, but 
there will be some residual that she is assumed to 
spend on non-housing goods). This function be-
haves qualitatively as a conventional demand func-
tion (Filatova, Parker, and van der Veen 2009). In 
this paper, buyers’ bid price is equal to their WTP 
[Filatova (2009) explores effects of bid prices that 
deviate from WTP depending on market condi-
tions]. Having identified their desired property 
and bid price, buyers submit their offer-bids to 
the sellers. 
 
 Sellers’ behavior. The ask price of a seller is 
equal to his reservation price, which is assumed 
to represent the agricultural land reservation price 
(Pag). In other papers we presented more ad-
vanced pricing strategies of sellers, allowing them 
to attempt to maximize their gains from trade 
(Filatova, Parker, and van der Veen 2009, Fila-
tova, van der Veen, and Parker 2009). 
 
Results 
 
We run three sets of experiments, each having a 
different parameterization for the perceived indi-
vidual damage coefficients across the population. 
In the first set of experiments, buyers have homo-
geneous damage coefficients equal to the average 
survey value ( idamC = 0.33). The second set of ex-
periments is performed with buyers whose per-
ceived damage coefficients are parameterized 
using the normalized distribution of “level of 
worry” from the survey data, as described above. 
Note that distribution of damage coefficients in 
the second case is skewed to the left, as in the 
survey results. In the third set of experiments, 
buyers’ damage coefficients are drawn from a 
uniform distribution ranging between zero and 
one. In summary, experiments 1 and 3 provide 
hypothetical baselines (a representative agent ap-
proach, based on the real-world mean, and a case 
of maximum dispersion of risk perceptions) for 
comparison to the real-world distribution of agent 
risk perceptions. 
 The aggregated results of the ALMA-C simula-
tions are spatial patterns of urban development, 
spatially explicit land-rent patterns (i.e., realized 
land transaction prices—the average of the ask 
price and the bid of the buyer with the highest 
valuation for the land—at different distances 
from the city center), and a set of economic and 
spatial metrics (bid price and land rents, urban 
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size, and urban extent). In addition, we estimate 
land-rent gradients for each experimental out-
come, using simulated transaction data, in the tra-
dition of spatial econometrics. Land-rent gradi-
ents are common measures used both in analytical 
and empirical models (see Anas, Arnold, and Small 
1998). Often they are constructed to test the de-
gree to which actual urban areas resemble the 
spatial structure of a monocentric model (Bell and 
Irwin 2002). Traditionally, analytical rent gradi-
ents have been derived from theoretical models, 
and these have been compared to rent gradient 
functions separately estimated from real-world 
data. The two modeling methods have remained 
disconnected, however, since the theoretical models 
do not produce the spatial patterns of heterogene-
ous land rents, linked to the heterogeneous attri-
butes of the successful bidder, that are used to 
estimate the real-world functions. ABM methods 
can uniquely produce simulated data, generated 
by a theoretical model, in the same structural 
form as the empirical data. The regression-based 
land-rent gradient estimates, therefore, provide a 
more direct link between theoretical and empiri-
cal models than was previously possible. 
 In all three experiments discussed in this paper, 
residential buyers are homogeneous with respect 
to their preferences for coastal amenities, prox-
imity to the CBD, and incomes. The only differ-
ence between the three experiments is the distri-
bution of individual damage coefficients of agents. 
The model parameters used in the three experi-
ments are listed in Table 3. Each experiment run 
was performed 30 times to avoid random number 
biases, although, in practice, output values differ 
very little between model runs. Summary tables 
report average values across model runs. Rent 
gradients are estimated using pooled data from all 
model runs. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1. Agents with a homogeneous coef-
ficient of perceived damage equal to the mean value 
of the survey sample. 
 Experiment 1 essentially employs the represen-
tative agent traditional for the conventional ana-
lytical model. The top part of Figure 4 shows the 
graphical form of the probability of natural 
hazard function, which is a function of distance 
from the coast. Its horizontal axis matches the 
map below. The bottom part of Figure 4 shows 
the rent patterns of the realized transactions. The 
dark area on the left represents the ocean and the 
white circle in the middle is the CBD. The inten-
sity of gray color symbolizes the value of land: 
the darker the color, the higher the land rent. The 
light-gray area represents the rural-urban fringe. 
The results verify theoretical expectations in the 
case of homogeneous, risk-averse buyers who 
value coastal amenities. Land rents decrease with 
the distance from the CBD, but are higher in the 
direction of the coast. There are no developments 
in the immediate proximity to the coastline: agents’ 
expected utility there is too low to outbid sellers’ 
reservation prices, given the flood risk. Note, this 
occurs even though the average buyers repre-
sented in this model perceive a low level of risk.4 
We call the line at which the city’s left seawards 
border stops the “safety contour” as a point of 
reference for the following experiments (Table 4). 
 We estimate a functional representation of the 
model’s rent gradient, using a regression with the 
model-generated land rents as our dependent vari-
able, and the two spatial variables—distance to 
the CBD and distance to the coast—as independ-
ent variables. A cubic regression model provided 
an adequate model fit (R2 = 0.98, Table 5). 
 Figure 5 presents a 2D cross-section of the city 
land values along the perpendicular connecting 
CBD to the coast. The Y axis represents the value 
of a spatial good, and the X axis represents dis-
tance to the coast. The distance to the CBD 
(situated 8 spatial units away from the coast) can 
be directly translated into distance to the coast 
(using DCBD = |Dcoast-8|) [see Filatova, van der 
Veen, and Parker (2009) for more details]. The 
estimated rent gradient for Experiment 1 is plot-
ted in the solid curve in Figure 5. It peaks at the 
CBD (the right dotted line) and decreases sea-
wards because all agents perceive uniformly high 
risk (their coefficient of perceived damage is equal 
to the mean value of the survey sample). Devel-
opments do not expand beyond the safety contour 
(the left dotted line). This rent gradient, again, re-
flects the valuations that would be obtained from 
a representative agent model, i.e., one that im-
posed an assumption of buyer homogeneity. 
 
                                                                                    
4 This outcome is a result of our particular model parameterization, 
chosen to create an appropriate baseline for our case study; alternative 
parameterizations are possible that would produce higher levels of de-
velopment and land values toward the coast. 
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Table 3. Values of Parameters in the Simulation Experiments 
Symbol Meaning Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Y Individual budget 800 800 800 
Pag Price for agricultural land 200 200 200 
TCU Transport costs per unit of distance 1 1 1 
b Constant in equation (3) 70 70 70 
α Individual preference for green amenities 0.6 0.6 0.6 
i
damC  Flood damage coefficient 0.33 Survey distribution Uniform distribution [0-1] 
avCdam Mean Cdam in the buyer population 0.33 0.33 0.5 
 
 
Table 4. Economic and Spatial Metric Outcomes of the ALMA-C Experiments 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Bid price, mean 212.46 215.61 213.33 
Bid price, sd 7.87 9.74 8.66 
Land rent, mean 206.23 207.81 206.67 
Land rent, sd 3.94 4.87 4.33 
Total property value in the city, mean 82492.08 129256 110841.6 
Total property value in the city, sd 0 20.07 1322.52 
City size (urbanized cells), mean 400 622 536.33 
City size (urbanized cells), sd 0 0 6.39 
City border (extensive margin), mean 22.02 26.93 23.58 
City border, (extensive margin), sd 0 0 0.68 
Urban cells seaward from safety contour, mean 0 204 121.9 
Urban cells seaward from safety contour, sd 0 0 6.38 
Total property value seaward from safety contour, mean 0 42913.45 25267.48 
Total property value seaward from safety contour, sd 0 0 1316.47 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2. Agents with heterogeneous coeffi-
cients of perceived damage parameterized using 
the survey data. 
 To review, the difference between Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 is that a representative agent 
with a damage coefficient equal to the mean value 
of the survey sample is replaced by a heterogene-
ous population of agents initialized with the em-
pirical distribution of “worry.” The average per-
ceived damage coefficient of the heterogeneous 
agents is equal to the mean value of survey data, 
i.e., the damage coefficient in Experiment 1. Thus, 
buyers are the same on average. Comparing out-
comes from Experiments 1 and 2 allows us to ex-
amine how accounting for the real-world hetero-
geneity of buyer’s risk perceptions affects pat-
terns of urbanization and land values. 
 Average bid prices and consequently land rents 
in Experiment 2 are a bit higher than in Experi-
ment 1 (see Table 4). Buyers in the population that 
have low perceived damage coefficients will per-
ceive even lower risk than the representative, 
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Table 5. Cubic Regression of Simulated Land Prices  
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
R2 0.9776 0.9886 0.8457 
Intercept 181.26 
(0.28 / 644.93) 
221.6 
(0.12 / 1862) 
213.59 
(0.4 / 536.97) 
Dam 10.58 
(0.08 / 141.03) 
-0.58 
(0.03 / -20.49) 
2.12 
(0.09 / 22.93) 
D 2am -1.02 
(0.01 / -150.82) 
-0.03 
(0 / -12.65) 
-0.26 
(0.01 / -30.84) 
D 3am 0.03 
(0 / 136.76) 
0 
(0 / 5.27) 
0.01 
(0 / 18.3) 
Dcbd -0.79 
(0.03 / -23.31) 
-0.63 
(0.02 / -29.9) 
-0.84 
(0.07 / -11.45) 
D 2cbd 0.0184 
(0.002 / 9.95) 
0.0048 
(0.001 / 38.7) 
0.0232 
(0.004 / 50.57) 
D 3cbd -1.00E-04 
(0 / -2.35) 
-4,00E-04 
(0 / -158.2) 
-4,00E-04 
(1.00E-04 / -42.7) 
D 2am × Dcbd 0.0021 
(0 / 10.51) 
-4,00E-04 
(1.00E-04 / -41.7) 
0.001 
(3.00E-04 / 32.75) 
Dam × D 2cbd -0.003 
(0 / -24.63) 
-3,00E-04 
(1.00E-04 / -43.1) 
-0.0027 
(3.00E-04 / -97.81) 
Dam × Dcbd 0.0172 
(0.005 / 3.58) 
0.0109 
(0.003 / 3.97) 
0.0204 
(0.009 / 22.03) 
Cdam NA -331.749 
(0.306 / 1082) 
-689.09 
(0.98 / 700.39) 
C 2dam NA 83.897 
(0.449 / 186.68) 
616.28 
(15.33 / 402.1) 
C 3dam NA -0.6994 
(0.275 / -27.158) 
-154.06 
(10.67 / 144.3) 
Cdam × D 2am NA -0.2097 
(0.003 / -749.4) 
-0.2262 
(0.008 / 271.3) 
C 2dam × Dam NA -0.6245 
(0.028 / -221.53) 
-28.641 
(0.099 / 289.3) 
Cdam × D 2cbd NA 0.0112 
(9.00E-04 / 125) 
0.0203 
(0.003 / 70.57) 
C 2dam × Dcbd NA -0.0618 
(0.015 / -4.24) 
-0.802 
(0.053 / 150.9) 
Cdam × Dam NA 54.179 
(0.053 / 101.75) 
76.882 
(0.16 / 478.03) 
Cdam × Dcbd NA -0.1524 
(0.023 / -65.81) 
0.2684 
(0.076 / 35.11) 
Note: Notations are as follows: estimate (st.error/t-value); Dam is distance to the coast; Dcbd is distance to the CBD; Cdam is individ-
ual coefficient of perceived damage. 
 
agent in Experiment 1, whose damage coefficient 
is already skewed to the left. Thus, these eco-
nomic agents value land in the flood-prone zone 
quite highly (because the proximity of coastal 
amenities is present and their flood risk percep-
tion is low or zero). As a result, spatial patterns in 
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Figure 5. 2D Cross Section of Rent Gradient 
 
 
Experiment 2 differ significantly from Experi-
ment 1, in spite of the fact that micro-attributes of 
agents in two experiments are the same on aver-
age. In contrast to Figure 4, almost all the area 
along the coastline in Figure 6a is urbanized. On 
average about 204 cells are converted into urban 
use in the zone seaward from safety contour, 
leaving 33 percent of the total property value in 
this coastal city under risk (Table 4). Total prop-
erty value in the city increased by 57 percent 
compared to Experiment 1. This is due to the 
increase in the bid price of agents with low risk 
perception who were willing to buy property at 
the coast, attracted by rich coastal amenities. 
When bid prices rose above the agricultural land 
price, more land was converted at the seaward 
border of the city, leading to a 56 percent increase 
in city size (where 51 percent is beyond the safety 
contour and 5 percent is at the outer border). 
 Figure 6b shows the spatial distribution of 
agents’ perceived damage coefficients. This fig-
ure illustrates a unique advantage of agent-based 
modeling: its ability to produce fine-scale infor-
mation regarding spatial and individual-level het-
erogeneity. This visualization confirms that the 
model is operating as expected (structural valida-
tion), and it further provides a potential target for 
empirical validation, in cases where spatially ex-
plicit survey data are available. Notably, the most 
seaward area where the probability of flooding or 
erosion is significant (see upper part of Figure 4) 
is occupied by agents with the lowest perceived 
  
6a 6b 
Figure 6. Results of Experiment 2 
(heterogeneous agents parameterized with 
empirical survey data): Land Rent Pattern 
(6a) and Map of Perceived Damage 
Coefficients of Agents Settled in the City (6b) 
Note: In graph on right, the white color means Cdam = 0, the 
darkest color means Cdam = 1. 
 
 
damage coefficient, Cdam = 0. At the same time, 
agents with higher Cdam (darker color in Figure 
6b) settle more landward. This sorting is an emer-
gent model outcome, since it is a result of a land 
market allocation. Specifically, agents with Cdam 
= 0 have much higher expected utility along the 
coast compared to agents with Cdam > 0. Thus, the 
former bid more for coastal properties than those 
with higher levels of worry about potential coastal 
risk. 
 One can also observe that, in spite of the fact 
that agents are heterogeneous, the land rents over 
most of the landscape appear as if there were ho-
mogeneous agents operating in the land market 
(Figure 6a). There is dispersion in land rents only 
in the area bordering the safety contour. Although 
this may seem counterintuitive given the model 
structure, the result can largely be explained by 
the distribution of risk perceptions. This result 
emerges due to the form of the buyers’ risk per-
ceptions (highly skewed to the left, with a rea-
sonably high proportion of zero values) and the 
skewed, almost discrete form of the hazard prob-
ability function. Buyers are heterogeneous only 
with respect to their coefficients of perceived 
damage, so differences in their bids for land occur 
only due to differential risk perceptions. The 
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market then allocates agents with zero damage 
coefficients seawards from the safety contour 
(Figure 6b). The majority of these buyers per-
ceive no risk, creating a zone of land rent patterns 
essentially produced by homogeneous buyers, 
who bid as if there were no flood or erosion risk 
disamenity associated with this land. Landwards 
from the safety contour, there are buyers who are 
heterogeneous with respect to their perceived 
damage coefficients (Figure 6b). However, since 
the actual hazard probability is approaching zero 
in this area (upper part of Figure 4), this spatial 
landscape is essentially homogeneous with re-
spect to flood/erosion risk, so heterogeneous dam-
age perceptions do not affect land rents. There is 
only a narrow strip of land in immediate prox-
imity to the safety contour where the actual prob-
ability of flooding/erosion is still significant, and 
where agents with non-zero coefficients of per-
ceived damage find it economically attractive to 
locate. 
 One of the advantages of agent-based market 
simulations is that agent-level characteristics can 
be recorded and analyzed together with market 
transaction data, providing more detailed data 
than often is available in the real world. Although 
this is model-generated data, not empirical, it al-
lows us to control for potential effects of hetero-
geneity in individual preferences and perceptions 
in our rent gradient estimates—and therefore to 
understand the theoretical effects of the individ-
ual level factors, even if we lack access to these 
data in a real-world context. Following Filatova 
et al. (2009), we econometrically estimate a rent 
gradient function for Experiment 2 using three 
explanatory variables: two spatial attributes (dis-
tances to the coast and CBD) and agents’ individ-
ual coefficients of perceived damage (Table 5). 
The estimated land gradient from Experiment 2 
(dashed curve), plotted using mean values for the 
buyer’s characteristics in Figure 5, behaves differ-
ently than the solid curve showing the estimated 
land-rent gradient of data from Experiment 1. It 
not only remains above the reservation price be-
yond the safety contour, but the dashed curve is 
also much higher than the solid one to the left of 
the CBD towards the coast, meaning higher land 
rents in the area beyond the safety contour and, 
consequently, higher direct potential damage in 
the case of a hazard—all resulting only from the 
empirically parameterized heterogeneity among 
agents. This highlights the importance of using the 
real-world distribution of risk perceptions, rather 
than taking a representative agent approach. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3. Agents with heterogeneous coeffi-
cients of perceived damage parameterized using 
uniform random distribution. 
 In Filatova, van der Veen, and Parker (2009), 
we highlight the importance of individual hetero-
geneity for the outcomes of a land market. Realiz-
ing difficulties in obtaining such data, we pro-
posed that researchers and policymakers should at 
least use a random distribution to explore the re-
sults of hypothetical agent heterogeneity. In Ex-
periment 3, we compare the results from Experi-
ment 2 to an outcome in which we assume that 
the actual distribution of buyer risk perceptions is 
unknown, but can be proxied by a uniform distri-
bution. This case could also be viewed as one in 
which people have no information about potential 
flood risk and make a random prediction regard-
ing potential risks. 
 As seen from comparison of Figures 7a and 6a, 
the spatial morphologies of the two estimated 
cities differ, with the uniform distribution produc-
ing a smaller city. The city border has shrunk by 
12 percent and the urban population has de-
creased by 14 percent (Table 4). The number of 
urban cells seawards from the safety contour is 
approximately half the number urbanized in Ex-
periment 2. The proportion of total property value 
under risk is 23 percent of the total value in the 
Experiment 2 city, compared to 33 percent in Ex-
periment 2. As before, this occurs because more 
land is converted into urban use than in Experi-
ment 1 (i.e., agents who underestimate coastal 
risks have high enough valuations of land along 
the coast to outbid the reservation price of sell-
ers). Since average risk perceptions are higher in 
Experiment 3 than Experiment 2 (avCdam = 0.33 
vs. avCdam = 0.5, Table 3), it might not be so 
surprising that a balanced uniform distribution 
causes fewer developments in the risky zone 
compared to a left-skewed distribution of worry. 
Nevertheless, other studies report that a uniform 
distribution provides the upper bound of variation 
of aggregated outcomes compared to parameteri-
zation with survey data (Brown and Robinson 
2006). We expect that the difference in our model 
results comes from the fact that our model im-
plements a formal land market with competitive 
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7a 7b 
Figure 7. Results of Experiment 3 
(heterogeneous agents parameterized with 
uniform distribution): Land Rent Pattern (7a) 
and Map of Perceived Damage Coefficients of 
Agents Settled in the City (7b) 
Note: The white color means Cdam = 0, the darkest color means 
Cdam = 1. 
 
 
bidding (rather than only demand-driven alloca-
tion), which alters final land development pat-
terns. Work in progress will allow us to formally 
test this hypothesis (Parker et al., forthcoming). 
 Experiment 3 leads to more urban expansion 
than Experiment 1, however, in spite of the fact 
that the average risk perception for Experiment 3 
(avCdam = 0.5) is higher than Experiment 1 
(avCdam = 0.33). Again, in Experiment 3 urbani-
zation spreads into the risky zone because the 
buyers with lower than average (Cdam = 0.33) risk 
perceptions drive market outcomes beyond the 
safety contour. These buyers simply do not exist 
in the market in the representative agent model in 
Experiment 1. 
 In this experiment, buyers who, through market 
sorting, have settled seawards of the safety con-
tour have very low, but still heterogeneous dam-
age coefficients. (Compare light gray color of cells 
along the coast in Figure 7b to the white color in 
Figure 6b). As a result, land rents are heterogene-
ous along the coast in Experiment 3, in contrast to 
Experiment 2. However, they are homogeneous 
landwards, similarly to Experiment 2, since the 
probability of flooding is near zero in this region. 
 Similarly to Experiment 2, we estimated land 
rent as a function of distance to the coast and the 
CBD and individual coefficient of perceived dam-
age, using cubic regression (R2 = 0.8457). The es-
timated 2D land-rent gradient, plotted in the dot-
dashed line in Figure 5, falls seawards from the 
CBD compared to the dashed estimated rent gradi-
ent of Experiment 2. Although it is still above the 
reservation price beyond the safety contour, the 
total value of the property under risk is much 
lower. Thus, land near the coast is more valuable 
for buyers parameterized with the skewed rather 
than the uniform distribution. 
 
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Micro-level data from surveys is being used more 
frequently as a building block for empirical agent-
based models. In this paper, we analyzed the re-
sults of a survey carried out in the Dutch province 
of Zeeland that was designed to, among other 
things, elucidate individual risk perception and 
factors affecting location choice (Krywkow, Fila-
tova, and van der Veen 2008). Consistent with 
other surveys, the survey showed that Dutch peo-
ple generally have low or very low worry about 
coastal flooding affecting them personally. The 
survey also showed that proximity to work is the 
most important factor that affects individual choice 
of location, followed by environmental amenities, 
with safety from flooding receiving the lowest 
rating. We constructed our expected utility func-
tion to include these main location choice factors, 
and we used the distribution of worry from the 
survey to parameterize agents in the ALMA-C 
model. 
 We performed three experiments with our ABM 
of a coastal land market. First, homogeneous 
buyers were parameterized with the mean value 
of worry about flood risk, reflecting a representa-
tive agent approach. Results mirrored those that 
would be expected from an analytical Alonso 
style model of the same system. For this model 
parameterization, flood risk outweighs amenity 
value along the coast for the representative agent. 
This model parameterization leads to relatively 
lower values, and therefore less development, in 
the flood-prone zones. Regression analysis of 
model-generated data demonstrates that the land 
rent is positively correlated with distance to the 
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coast, as shown in the downward slope of the 
estimated rent gradient towards the coast (Figure 
5). These model results are consistent with the 
survey results, which indicated that on average 
people are more likely to pay for safety than for 
amenities (Table 1) and that average WTP for 
safety is slightly higher than WTP for amenities 
(Table 2). 
 However, in the real world, it is not the aver-
age, representative buyer who is active in the land 
market, but rather a diverse distribution of buyers. 
Therefore, in our second experiment, heterogene-
ous buyers were parameterized with the leftward-
skewed survey distribution of worry about flood 
risk. Compared to the homogeneous population, 
the land market outcome based on the real-world 
distribution of perceived flood damage showed a 
higher level of development in the flood prone 
zone, with a significant proportion of urban land 
value concentrated in this region. These results 
demonstrate the utility of the agent-based model-
ing approach, which facilitates estimation of a 
land-rent gradient based on market equilibrium 
land transaction prices produced by heterogene-
ous buyers operating over a spatially heterogene-
ous two-dimensional landscape. 
 Note that in this case the coast serves as a net 
attractor: the estimated rent gradient slopes up-
wards in the direction of the coast. In other 
words, given a realistic, skewed distribution of 
buyer risk perceptions, those with relatively low 
risk perceptions will express their relatively high 
WTP for coastal land through engaging in land 
market transactions in the risky zone, consistent 
with the WTP survey results. While these results 
showed that the majority of the respondents had a 
positive WTP for safety (66.51 percent) (Table 1), 
about 17 percent expressed a zero WTP for safety. 
Consistent with the survey data, modeled buyers 
with low “worry” have relatively high bids for 
land along the coast, and those with a higher level 
of “worry” have higher WTP for safety. Sorting 
between these agent types occurs through bilat-
eral land market trading. Based on buyer’s simu-
lated WTP functions, the land market allocates 
people with a lower coefficient of perceived dam-
age closer to the coast and buyers with high 
“worry” to the safer areas farther from the coast. 
Regression analysis of the model-generated data 
also shows that land value is negatively correlated 
with individual perceived damage (Table 5), as 
expected. 
 In our third set of experiments, heterogeneous 
buyers were parameterized with a uniform distri-
bution of the coefficient of perceived damage, in 
order to show the difference between micro-level 
parameterization with skewed data (Experiment 
2) vs. uniform data (Experiment 3). Driven by the 
existence of agents with relatively low levels of 
risk perceptions, more development and higher 
land values occurred in the risky zone than in the 
representative agent model, in spite of the fact 
that the mean level of risk perception in this 
model was higher than that in the representative 
agent model. However, consistent with the higher 
mean risk perception and form of the distribution 
of risk perceptions, which resulted in a lower pro-
portion of agents in the low risk perception 
groups, less development occurred in the risky 
zones with the uniform distribution than with the 
real-world skewed distribution. This implies that 
even if decisions were made based on random 
guesses about flood risk in the coastal zone area, 
they would still result in fewer developments and 
less potential damage in the risky zone than what 
is happening when buyers in the land market have 
the skewed risk perception specific to the Dutch 
population. 
 From a modeling perspective, these results 
demonstrate the influence of buyer heterogeneity 
on land market outcomes—not simply the impor-
tance of acknowledging heterogeneity, but the 
importance of understanding the distribution of 
agent characteristics, possible in an empirical 
context only through high-quality micro data in-
puts. From a policy perspective, these results 
highlight a challenge faced by policymakers world-
wide when individuals who underestimate risks 
settle in hazard-prone areas. As more land is con-
verted into urban use and property at stake rises, 
the pressure on the government to fund structural 
defense measures (e.g., beach nourishment, dikes) 
to protect these individual investments grows. If 
government steps in and provides compensation 
for potential damage or offers publicly funded 
protection, this further unleashes development in 
hazard-prone but amenity-rich areas, at larger so-
cietal costs. While much is discussed about this 
self-reinforcing cycle in the United States (Wie-
ner 1996, Barnhizer 2003, Kunreuther and Pauly 
2006), this issue is largely neglected within the 
Dutch water management policy. The model pre-
sented in this paper helps visualize the effects of 
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low risk perception on spatial patterns and land 
rents in hazard-prone areas, and may help design 
policies that influence individual behavior to pro-
mote socially desired outcomes. Various instru-
ments that help individuals integrate risks in their 
location decisions (e.g., risk communication, fi-
nancial instruments, or engineering measures) may 
be employed to increase individual responsibility 
for living in hazard-prone areas (Filatova, Mul-
der, and van der Veen 2011). In the absence of 
such instruments and given the current structure 
of risk perceptions in the Netherlands, a signi-
ficant degree of high-valued development is 
likely to occur in these risky zones, creating eco-
nomic hardship and a major challenge for govern-
ment if flood damage were to occur. 
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